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The Schrodinger equation, which describes the deterministic evolution of

quantum states, usually predicts that
when subatomic particles interact with
a measurement device, the apparatus
"pointer" will be left in a so-called superposition of states so that there is no matter
offact about what the measurement result
is. Yet experiments do have definite outcomes: The macroscopic superpositions
quantum theory predicts seem never to be
observed. To be sure, the Schrodinger
equation yields excellent statistical predictions for measurements results. Yet it cannot explain the nondeterministic "collapse" in the quantum state that seems to
be required for measurements to have definite outcomes. InQuantum Mechanics and
Experience, David Albert critiques leading
attempts to solve this measurement problem and gives a good overall introduction
to the foundations of quantum mechanics. Surprising stories about our psychological experiences arise when he applies
these interpretations of quantum mechanic to belief states of sentient observers.
Yet Albert's storie seem to be at least as
much a product of trong physicalist and
reductionist theses as of the interpretations of quantum mechanics he considers.
The focus of the book is introduced with
a lucid statement of the measurement
problem. But Albert pushes beyond traditional presentations by discussing the belief states of a sentient observer. He argues
that the equations of quantum mechanics
predict that an observer's brain should be
in a superposition of belief states after a
measurement, a state in which there is no
matter of fact about what she believes. Yet
this is "at odds with what we know of ourselves by direct introspection ... and so
things are turning out badly"
otice,
though, that Albert assumes "that everything in the world always evolves in accordance with the dynamical equations of
motion" of quantum mechanics, pace the
difficulties of precis ly how mental states
supervene on brain states, which he admits. Also, Albert's reductionism forces interpretations of quantum mechanics to account for something that physical theories
are seldom required to explain: namely,
the belief states of sentient observers.
This is nowhere more apparent than in
his treatment of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Webel' (GRW) spontaneous collapse theory.
Albert uses a fictional thought experiment
to argue that, although an observer can be
functionally described as a knower of measurement results, the GRW theory predicts
that the observer must be in a superpOSition of belief states and hence cannot truly
be a knower. Albert considers these good
reasons to reject not just the GRW theory
but all collapse theories. But until GRW are
given plausible reasons for believing that
brains can really generate belief states in
accord with Albert's simple quantum mechanical model (involving only a single
subatomic particle and a hypothetical
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brain implant') they are likely to deny the
force of the argument.
Albert sympathetically
introduces the
Bolun theory as one of the best efforts to
solve the measurement
problem-although again he questions it because of its
inability to account for belief states and
knowledge claims. But, for Albert, "what's
so cool about this theory" is that it contains
nothing ambiguous or unintelligible and
"nothing metaphysically
novel." In this
theory "the whole universe always evolves
deterministically" but conspires to appear
quantum mechanical. This is just one example of where Albert's distinctive style
leads him to overstate his claim. There are
key elements of the Balun theory-such
as
its sourceless quantum potential and the
contextualism
of properties
it implies,
which Albert himself later emphasizeswithout metaphysical counterparts in classical mechanics.
The book closes with a chapter on "selfmeasurement" that contains even more "interesting surprises" about the unimaginably
rich and private mental lives of quantummechanical observers. There is also an appendix that attempts to refute modal interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Quantum Mechanics and Experience will
appeal mostly to nonspecialists. Albert's
colloquial style makes the introductory
chapters less daunting than most other introductions. His use of observables
like
"hardness" and "color" to represent spin
observables is helpful to nonspecialists at
the outset. However, it conceals, until
much later in the book, that the particular
conception of properties, such as "hard"
and "soft," actually depends very much
on the interpretation
being considered.
And for specialists, mock observables like
"scrad" and "zap" are distracting because
one is constantly
wanting to translate
lengthy equations involving them into
standard spin notation. Although the confabulation between the main text and the
footnotes (and the numerous parenthetical remarks) is distracting, Albert's energetic style makes the book a lively and
provocative
read.-Francisco
Flores and

Robert Cliftan, Philosophy, University of Western Ontario
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